While some of us have more free time, others are homeschooling or unable to visit libraries, the Royal Institute, with thanks to the Cambridge University Press, is happy to make a lot of our archive freely available.
We asked the editors and their teams (thank you Matthew Hewson) to choose papers from the main areas of philosophy, and it's a star-studded line up -- some really fascinating lesser known pieces too.
Follow the links below to download PDFs (button on the left). We aim to update this page with new articles regularly.
Derek Parfit, 'We are not human beings'
We can start with some science fiction. Here on Earth, I enter the Teletransporter. When I press some button, a machine destroys my body, while recording the exact states of all my cells. This information is sent by radio to Mars, where another machine makes, out of organic materials, a perfect copy of my body. The person who wakes up on Mars seems to remember living my life up to the moment when I pressed the button, and is in every other way just like me.
E J Lowe, 'Causal closure principles and emergentism'
Causal closure arguments against interactionist dualism are currently popular amongst physicalists. Such an argument appeals to some principles of the causal closure of the physical, together with certain other premises, to conclude that at least some mental events are identical with physical events. However, it is crucial to the success of any such argument that the physical causal closure principle to which it appeals is neither too strong nor too weak by certain standards. In this paper, it is argued that various forms of naturalistic dualism, of an emergentist character, are consistent with the strongest physical causal closure principles that can plausibly be advocated.
Gilbert Ryle, 'Meaning and Necessity'
PROFESSOR CARNAP in his new book proffers a method for analysing and describing the meanings of expressions and, more briefly, discusses the theory of logical modalities, the concepts, that is, of logical necessity and possibility.
His meaning-analysis is in the main intended as an improvement upon certain doctrines and practices of Frege. His account of the modal concepts of logic is in the main intended as an improvement upon certain doctrines of C. I. Lewis. Views of Quine, Russell, Tarski, Church and others are also discussed.
Kit Fine, 'Mathematics: Discovery or Invention?'
Mathematics has been the most successful and is the most mature of the sciences ... What we require is proof; and, in practice, there is very little disagreement over whether or not we have it. The other sciences, by contrast, tend to get mired in controversy over the significance of this or that experimental finding or over whether one theory is to be preferred to another.
Stephen Law, 'Is It All Relative?'
Many claim that we are wrong to condemn cultures with moral codes different from our own: their moralities are no less valid. Similarly, some claim that while astrology and Feng Shui might be ‘false’ from a Western, scientific viewpoint, they are ‘true’ when viewed from alternative, New Age points of view. What's ‘true’ and what's ‘false’ ultimately depend on where one is standing.
Is this sort of relativism about truth tenable?
John Hyman, 'Is Beauty in the Eye of The Beholder?'
In this article, John Hyman argues that beauty does not consist in mathematical perfection; that Hume was mistaken in claiming that beauty exists only in the mind; that we can discover what is really beautiful by learning to give reasons for our preferences; and that some things in the world are beautiful—probably many more than we imagine.
G EM Anscombe, 'Modern Moral Philosophy'
I will begin by stating three theses which I present in this paper. The first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology ...
Alasdair MacIntyre, 'Social Structures and their Threats to Moral Agency'
To refuse to find one's place within the hierarchies of approved roles, or to have been refused a place, because judged unfit for any such role, was to be classified as socially deviant and irresponsible...
Cora Diamond, 'Eating Meat and Eating People'
This paper is a response to a certain sort of argument defending the rights of animals. Part I is a brief explanation of the background and of the sort of argument I want to reject; Part II is an attempt to characterize those arguments: they contain fundamental confusions about moral relations between people and people and between people and animals. And Part III is an indication of what I think can still be said on—as it were–the animals' side.
Peter Singer, 'Utility and the Survival Lottery'
Peter Singer's take on John Harris' famous thought experiment about an organ donation lottery, with its implications for our views on whether or not there's a moral difference between killing and letting die.
Joanna North, 'Wrongdoing and Forgiveness'
The value of forgiveness lies in the fact that it essentially requires a recognition of the wrongdoer's responsibility for his action, and that forgiveness typically involves an effort on the part of the one wronged: a conscious attempt to improve oneself in relation to the wrongdoer.
Christine Korsgaard, 'Personhood, Animals, and The Law'
The idea that all the entities in the world may be, for legal and moral purposes, divided into the two categories of ‘persons’ and ‘things’ comes down to us from the tradition of Roman law. In the law, a ‘person’ is essentially the subject of rights and obligations, while a thing may be owned as property. In ethics, a person is an object of respect, to be valued for her own sake, and never to be used as a mere means to an end, while a thing has only a derivative value, and may be used as a means to some person's ends. This bifurcation is unfortunate because it seems to leave us with no alternative but to categorize everything as either a person or a thing. Yet some of the entities that give rise to the most vexing ethical problems are exactly the ones that do not seem to fit comfortably into either category. For various, different, kinds of reasons, it seems inappropriate to categorize a fetus, a non-human animal, the environment, or an object of great beauty, as a person, but neither does it seem right to say of such things that they are to be valued only as means.
Gerald Harrison and Julia Tanner, 'Better Not To Have Children'
Most people take it for granted that it's morally permissible to have children. They may raise questions about the number of children it's responsible to have or whether it's permissible to reproduce when there's a strong risk of serious disability. But in general, having children is considered a good thing to do, something that's morally permissible in most cases (perhaps even obligatory). In this article we provide a number of reasons for thinking that it is both wrong and unwise to procreate.
Mary Warnock, 'Genetic Engineering and What Is Natural'
Some argue that genetic engineering and other scientific practices are morally wrong because they are ‘unnatural’. Prince Charles took this line in his 2000 Reith Lecture. But as Mary Warnock here points out, attempts to justify the moral condemnation of a practice on the grounds that it is ‘contrary to nature’ are notoriously difficult to sustain.
Tim Scanlon, 'Responsibility and the Value of Choice'
Imagine that you are struggling to finish a project, with the deadline fast approaching. Nearly done, you are about to print out what you have finished when a dialog box appears on your computer screen telling you that you must download and install an update for some piece of software. Frustrated, you try to make it go away, but it keeps reappearing. So you relent and click on ‘Install’, and your screen is filled with small print listing ‘Terms and Conditions’. You do not have time to scroll through the whole thing. So you click ‘Agree’. The installation begins, and you are relieved that it takes only a few minutes. Soon you are back at work and have finished your project.
Jonathan Wolff, 'Are We Good Enough For Democracy?'
Is democracy a good thing? Most of us think so. And yet, as Jonathan Wolff here explains, Plato thought democracy was a very bad idea. If you favour democracy (and I'm guessing you do), then your challenge is to explain what, if anything, is wrong with Plato's argument. So can you?